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Abstract
The State of Florida appealed the decision of an Osceola County circuit
court which dismissed the prosecution of a juvenile in adult criminal
court.
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I I
Prosecutorial Waiver Of Juveniles Into Adult
Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice ... Or The
End of Justice? State v. Cain.
The State of Florida appealed the decision of an Osceola County cir-
cuit court which dismissed the prosecution of a juvenile in adult crimi-
nal court. Mark Cain, a minor, had been charged with two counts of
armed burglary, and two counts of grand theft. In his motion to dis-
miss, Cain attacked the constitutionality of Florida Statute
§ 39.04(2)(e)4.1 This statute vests the state attorney with authority to
prosecute juveniles, who are 16 years of age or older, in the adult crim-
inal courts when they have committed two past delinquent acts, one of
which was a felony.2 Cain contended that the statute unconstitutionally
delegates to the state attorney unfettered discretion to prosecute
juveniles as adults.3 Further, he argued that the statute violates due
process of law in that juveniles are transferred to the adult criminal
court system without a hearing. The circuit court agreed with Cain,
granted his motion to dismiss, and held the statute unconstitutional.5
The state appealed.
This case represents an attempt by the Supreme Court of Florida
to decide whether the legislature can constitutionally vest the state at-
torney with the power to terminate the juvenile court of its exclusive
1. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1980).
2. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980):
The State attorney may... with respect to any child who at the time of com-
mission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, file an information when
in his judgment and discretion, ihe public interest requires that adult sanctions
be considered or imposed. Upon motion of the child the case shall be transfered
for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by
the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delin-
quent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a
felony.
3. 381 So. 2d at 1362.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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jurisdiction over minors, and prosecute them as adult criminals.
The Florida legislature acted in chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes
to create the Juvenile Justice Act.6 Pursuant to this chapter the juve-
nile division of the circuit court is given the exclusive jurisdiction to
handle proceedings involving minors. 7 However, there are three statu-
tory exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction which allow the juvenile to
be thrust into the adult criminal court system. First, the juvenile court,
in a waiver hearing, may waive its jurisdiction over any child fourteen
years of age or older8 where the criteria delineated in Florida Statute
§ 39.09(2)(c)1-8 are fulfilled. Second, adult criminal prosecution can
be pursued by the return of a grand jury indictment. The indictment
must charge the child with a crime punishable by death or life impris-
onment.9 Finally, the state attorney may divest the juvenile court of its
jurisdiction by filing an information against the child. The state attor-
ney through § 39.04(2)(e)4 is given discretion to file informations
against minors when he believes the public interest will be served best
by the imposition of adult sanctions. 10 This last exception was at issue
in Cain.
The Florida Supreme Court in Cain, upheld the constitutionality
of Florida Statute § 39.04(2)(e)4 1 which pertains to a waiver invoked
by the prosecution. The decision of the court can be questioned on
three particular grounds. First, in order to uphold the present waiver
statute, the court used past precedent involving the constitutionality of
waiver by grand jury indictment. To view these two types of waiver as
comparable mistakes the inherent differences between the office of the
state attorney and that of the grand jury. Second, in upholding the
present waiver statute, the court sanctioned the use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. This action by the court is dubious in light of the United States
Supreme Court's opinion of United States v. Kent.1 2 Third, the court
asserted that a juvenile's rights are not lessened when he is transferred
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1) (1979).
7. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1979).
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1979).
9. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979).
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979).
11. 381 So. 2d at 1368.
12. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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Waiver of Juveniles
to criminal court. 13 This statement underestimates the advantages of-
fered by the juvenile system.
In Cain, the court rejected the juvenile's due process attacks by
relying on Johnson v. State 4 and Woodward v. Wainwright.5 These
cases upheld the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 39.02(5)(c)16
which allows adult prosecution of juveniles upon the return of a grand
jury indictment charging the juveniles with an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment. The Cain court stated that there was no
difference between a state attorney's ability to file an information
against a juvenile and the power of the state attorney, as upheld in
Johnson, to refer the case to a grand jury for possible indictment.' 7
Justice Sundberg, writing the Cain opinion, reasoned that since the
present case was indistinguishable from Johnson, a conclusion that the
present statute is constitutional must follow.
The court's finding that there is no difference between the prosecu-
tor's power to file an information and his ability to refer the case to a
grand jury is dubious at best. First, in filing an information, it is the
state attorney who formulates the charge against the minor.18 When
the case is referred to the grand jury, it is the grand jury and not the
state attorney who charges the juvenile.19 Second, the office of the state
attorney is an entity separate and distinct from that of the grand jury,
with decision-making processes which are totally dissimilar.
13. 381 So. 2d at 1366.
14. 314 So. 2d 573 (1975).
15. 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979) reads in part:
A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death
or by life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set
forth in s. 39.067 unless and until an indictment on such charge is returned by
the grand jury. When an indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if
any, shall be dismissed and the child shall be tried and handled in every respect
as if he were an adult.
17. 381 So. 2d at 1364.
18. 17 FLA. JUR. Indictments and Informations § 3 (1964), which reads in part:
"An information is a written accusation of crime preferred by a grand jury."
19. Id. "An indictment is a written accusation or charge of a crime, against one
or more persons, presented upon oath or affirmation by a grand jury legally convoked."
Id.
4891
1 5:1981
3
Day: Prosecutorial Waiver Of Juveniles Into Adult Criminal Court: The
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
490 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
This latter notion was espoused in the case of Gerstein v. Pugh.20
One issue in Gerstein was whether a person arrested on an information
was entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause, prior to de-
tention. State Attorney Gerstein attempted to defend the power of the
prosecutor to charge non-capital offenders by information, without a
preliminary hearing, by arguing that the prosecutor's decision to file an
information is, itself, a judicial determination of probable cause.21 He
further asserted that this identical procedure was practiced by the
grand jury.2 The United States Supreme Court rejected his argument
and revoked the power of the state attorney to charge non-capital of-
fenders by information without a hearing.28 However, it allowed this
procedure to continue with regard to the grand jury.
Gerstein illustrates the inherent differences between the state at-
torney and the grand jury. The grand jury was permitted to substitute
its judgment on probable cause for that of the court because of its rela-
tionship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individuals
from unjust prosecution .2 This same substitution of judgment was not
granted to the state attorney because the prosecutor's responsibility to
law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral
and detached magistrate. 5
The Gerstein court's finding was based on the premise that the
decision-making process of the grand jury is clothed with restraint,
while the state attorney operates unrestrained. A grand jury impanel-
ment by the court 28 operates as a check on its decision-making process.
Furthermore, the diverse membership of the grand jury creates a cer-
20. 420 U.S. 103 (1974).
21. Id. at 116-17.
22. Id. at 113.
23. Id. at 114.
24. Id. at 117 n.19.
25. Id. at 117.
26. 15 FLA. JUR. Grand Jury § 2 (1964) states:
A grand jury is an agency of the state, and a part of its judicial system. . . . In
essence it is a creature of the court since it cannot constitute itself on its own
initiative but can act as a grand jury ... only when summoned, impaneled and
convened by the court.
§ 5 states: "Courts invested with criminal jurisdiction have long been re-
garded as having a resulting and implied power with reference to the organiza-
tion of the grand jury."
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/8
tain internal policing of its actions. However, the state attorney pro-
ceeds without any of these restraints and with practically unfettered
discretion.
Therefore, to state that there is no difference between the state
attorney's power to file an information and his ability to refer the case-
to the grand jury mistakes the fact that two separate institutions are
formally accusing the juvenile, and that each entity arrives at its deci-
sion to charge in very different ways. It logically follows that Johnson
v. State,27 which upheld waiver through grand jury indictment, cannot
be relied upon to uphold the constitutionality of the present statute.
The Supreme Court in Cain also resisted the juvenile's due process
attacks by sanctioning the use of prosecutorial discretion, as created by
§ 39.04(2)(e)4. This action by the court seems to run against the
landmark juvenile case United States v. Kent.28
In United States v. Kent, Morris Kent, a juvenile, was appre-
hended and interrogated concerning a housebreaking and rape.29 With-
out conducting an investigation, as required by statute,30 the juvenile
court judge transferred Kent to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Kent was found guilty of housebreaking and sentenced to the
psychiatric ward of the local hospital. The case was eventually ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, which held that although a
minor has no constitutional right to be treated in a separate juvenile
court system, once such a system is authorized by statute a juvenile
may not be transferred away from it until due process requirements are
met.31 The court in Kent asserted that the waiver process has tremen-
dous consequences for the juvenile, thus due process requires that no
transfer to criminal court should occur without a hearing, ceremony, or
a statement of reasons.3 2
In its decision, the court did not specifically enumerate the reasons
which should be considered before a juvenile judge transfers a minor to
the adult criminal system. However, the decision cited the eight stan-
dards for review of waiver which were included in the appellee's appen-
27. 314 So. 2d 573 (1975).
28. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. Id. at 543.
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961). This is set forth at 383 U.S. at 547-48.
31. 383 U.S. at 557.
32. Id. at 554.
5:1981
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dix.33 These standards came from the District of Columbia courts and
are as follows:3'
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the offense was against persons or against property.
4. The merit of the complaint.
5. Where the codefendants are adults, the desirability of trying the entire
action at one trial.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile.
7. Previous contact with juvenile court.
8. The likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile.
These District of Columbia standards have been adopted in subse-
quent judicial decisions" and state statutes." Florida adopted these
standards almost verbatim and in 1975 incorporated them into their
statutes. 7 These standards have gone a long way to protect the basic
33. Id. at 565-67.
34. Id. at 566-67.
35. See, e.g. State v. Lemmon, 110 Ariz. 568, _, 521 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1974);
Miklousky v. State, 54 Wis. 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
36. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act Pub. L. 1464, No. 333, § 28(4), 11 Pa. Stat.
50-325(a) (1972).
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)1-8 as amended in 1978 states as the criteria for
transfer:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the pro-
tection of the community is best served by transfering the child for adult
sanctions.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premedi-
tated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the child's associates in the alleged crime are adults or children who are to be
tried as adults who will be or have been charged with a crime.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the child, including:
5:91
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premise of our juvenile court which is, whenever possible, a minor
should be treated, not punished, and that rehabilitation, not retribution
is the goal to be attained.3 8
In the instant case, the threshold question becomes: what effect
does prosecutorial discretion, as created by § 39.04(2)(e)4, have on the
Kent guidelines for transferring juveniles to criminal court? The an-
swer is clear. The statute permits the state to file an information
against a juvenile and thrust the minor into adult criminal court, with-
out ever considering the Kent standards. Should the Florida Supreme
Court have sanctioned such power?
Consider the effects of this discretion. First, the state attorney op-
erates free and unrestrained in making his decision regarding waiver.39
Second, he is the only party who evaluates that decision; as most courts
have held, the prosecutor's use of this discretion is non-reviewable.' °
Third, the juvenile court judge, a neutral and detached arbiter of jus-
tice, is required by Florida Statute 1 to consider the eight Kent guide-
lines before effectuating waiver. Yet, the state attorney, who is an ad-
vocate within the system, may bypass these standards, subjecting the
a. Prior periods of probation or community control;
b. Previous contacts with the department, other law enforcement agencies,
and courts;
c. Prior adjudication that the child committed a delinquent act or violation
of law, greater weight being given if the child had previously been found
by a court to have committed a delinquent act involving an offense classi-
fied as a misdemeanor; and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rea-
sonable rehabilitation of the child, if he is found to have committed the alleged
offenses, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to
the court.
38. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967); FLA. STAT. § 39.001(l)(2)(3)
(1979).
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980) reads in part that: "The
state attorney may. . . file an information when in his judgment and discretion the
public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed."
40. See Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977); Russel v. Par-
ratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir.
1972); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c) (1979).
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minor to the adult system by the single act of filing an information.
Are these effects compatible with the Kent holding that a decision
of such tremendous consequences should not be rendered without a
hearing, ceremony, or a statement of reasons? Does prosecutorial dis-
cretion safeguard the basic premise of the juvenile system which is
treatment, not punishment; rehabilitation, not retribution? Will the
state attorney, as an adversary, consider the welfare of the accused in
making his waiver decision, or will he seek transfer of juveniles in re-
sponse to political pressure or society's demand for retribution? It is
suggested that these questions answer themselves.
The Florida Supreme Court should have, at least, endeavored to
reconcile the statute directly with Kent. Instead, the court attempted to
evade Kent, holding that its safeguards were applicable only to judges
in judicial proceedings and not to prosecutors.42 It indeed seems puz-
zling to assert that procedural safeguards should be applicable to a
judge, who is a neutral magistrate, and yet contend that these same
safeguards do not apply to the prosecutor, who is an advocate. Should
not procedural requirements be more carefully guarded when the unfet-
tered prosecutor is the decision maker? 43
Judge Skelly Wright, dissenting in United States v. Bland,4 wrote
that the statutory vesting of waiver authority in the prosecutor could
only be created to countermand the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Kent.4 He stated that such a statute played fast and loose
with fundamental rights and concluded that this blatant attempt to
evade the force of the Kent decision should not be permitted to suc-
ceed." One can conclude, therefore, that the Florida Supreme Court's
sanctioning of prosecutorial discretion through § 39.04(2)(e)4, rests
upon questionable grounds.
The justices in Cain bolstered their finding of statutory constitu-
tionality by stating that the minor loses very few advantages when he is
transferred to adult criminal court.'7 This statement underestimates the
advantages offered by the juvenile justice system.
42. 381 So. 2d at 1365-66.
43. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. Id.
45. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
46. 472 F.2d at 1341.
47. 381 So.2d at 1366-67.
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Flexibility is an asset unique to juvenile court. There are a myriad
of different programs to which a juvenile offender can be directed.
Those include projects centered around diversion, 48 plans directed at
reinforcing family support 9 and community based programs.50 The jus-
tices in Cain suggested that the adult criminal court is not precluded
from resorting to these programs.5 1 However, the statute presently in
issue provides that a prosecutor should file an information when he
feels adult sanctions should be imposed against the juvenile.52 It must
be concluded, that once in the adult criminal system, the juvenile will
be deprived of access to these valuable programs.
Statistics clearly suggest that shorter periods of incarceration exist
in the juvenile system. 3 In Kent, the maximum period of incarceration
the defendant would have received as a juvenile would have been five
years, while as an adult, the maximum would have been life imprison-
ment. In conjunction with this fact, two prominent sociologists have
conducted studies which indicate that longer periods of incarceration
create greater criminality among juveniles."
Finally, it must be remembered that the intent of the juvenile sys-
tem is treatment and rehabilitation. The adjudication of a minor in the
juvenile system turns not upon the issue of guilt,55 but upon such fac-
tors as the child's maturity, his susceptibility to rehabilitation, and the
needs of society. When the juvenile is projected into the adult criminal
court system, these factors, unlike the paramount issue of guilt, are
absent from consideration.56
48. See Juv. & Fain. Court J. 53 (August 1980).
49. See Juv. & Fam. Court J. 49 (May 1980).
50. Id. at 54.
51. 381 So. 2d at 1367.
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
53. Supra note 49.
54. Yochelson and Samenow reported these studies in Juvenile & Family Court
Journal 24 (May 1980).
55. 383 U.S. at 554-55.
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is
rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris. The juvenile
court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society
rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide mea-
sures of guidance... not to fix guilt.
56. 472 F.2d at 1349.
9
Day: Prosecutorial Waiver Of Juveniles Into Adult Criminal Court: The
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
It is clear that the juvenile system, by design, offers many opportu-
nities to the juvenile that simply don't exist in the adult criminal sys-
tem. Any statement by a court to the contrary is groundless.
The Florida Supreme Court has sanctioned prosecutorial waiver of
juveniles into the adult criminal court system. It has done so with per-
plexing statements and doubtful logic. The effect of the supreme court's
action will be that many 16 and 17 year olds will be sent to adult
prisons where they will serve time with hardened criminals.57 As Judge
Wright states, these children will be sentenced without any meaningful
inquiry into the possibility of rehabilitation through humane juvenile
disposition.58 He states further that we will hear from these juveniles
again, and that the kind of society we have in the years to come will
depend, in no small measure, upon our treatment of them now.59
Tim Day
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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